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Abstract
We propose a highly schematic economic model in which, in some cases, wage inequalities
lead to higher overall social welfare. This is due to the fact that high earners can consume low
productivity, non essential products, which allows everybody to remain employed even when the
productivity of essential goods is high and producing them does not require everybody to work.
We derive a relation between heterogeneities in technologies and the minimum Gini coefficient
required to maximize global welfare. Stronger inequalities appear to be economically unjustified.
Our model may shed light on the role of non-essential goods in the economy, a topical issue when
thinking about the post-Covid-19 world.
1 Introduction
The issue of income and wealth inequalities is now at the top of the political agenda in many countries.
It is also a fascinating scientific problem, with a flurry of academic studies, ranging from detailed data
analysis to economic models, historical accounts and philosophical arguments. Piketty’s “Capital in
the XXIst Century” is a worldwide bestseller [1], maybe soon joined by his second book, “Capital &
Ideology” [2]. Statistical models of income and wealth dynamics have a long history, starting with
Champernowne [3] and Angle [4], with a particular upsurge in the “Econophysics” literature since
2000 – for recent reviews see e.g. [5–7], and, for economics papers [8, 9].
Whereas too much inequality (as well as too much equality) seems both morally unfair and eco-
nomically inefficient, there is no compelling argument allowing one to decide which level of inequality
policy makers should target. If one thinks, for example, in terms of the classic Gini coefficient1 G, is
there an optimal value of G that we can rationally agree on? Should G be less than 0.3 like in Scandi-
navian countries, or is 0.35 or even 0.4 still acceptable? Should this target be independent of the level
of development of an economy? How does the level of inequality affect economic growth and global
social welfare [10]? Are “the rich” catalysts or parasites?
These questions are unfortunately fraught with ideological considerations. The rich are depicted as
heroes or villain in a knee-jerk fashion, depending on which side of the political spectrum one speaks
from. Is there a way to frame the debate in more neutral, rational terms? John Rawles, for example,
famously argued that the income distribution should be such that the wage of the poorest households
is maximized [11]. This, however, does not a priori constrain the Gini index in any way. Free market
advocates believe that the whole debate is moot: whatever comes out of a free market economy is
by definition optimal [12]. There is a growing literature on optimal taxes, in particular progressive,
redistributive taxes and/or bequeath taxes, see e.g. [13–15]. A standard argument for limiting tax
progressivity (and therefore keeping inequalities above a certain level) is a potential reduction of the
incentives to work and to invest in skills. A stronger public sector, on the other hand, can be beneficial
in terms of long term growth, through different channels such as health, education, public research,
etc. [16]. However, crazy-looking initiatives launched by single individuals, which would never be
1The Gini coefficient G ∈ [0, 1] measures the average absolute income (or wealth) difference in a population, rescaled by
(twice) the average wealth.
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decided collectively by any sensible public agency, can lead to ground-breaking innovations that are
collectively beneficial.
Another interesting line of thought was developed by V. Venkatasubramanian in a recent book called
“How Much Inequality Is Fair?” [17], transposing ideas from statistical mechanics (in particular the
maximum entropy criterion) to define an acceptable level of inequalities.
The aim of this note is to explore another avenue, namely the impact of economic development and
labour productivity on wage inequalities. We argue that when the utility associated to the consumption
of goods saturates (i.e. when further consumption brings no extra utility at all), then increased produc-
tivity can lead to unemployment, which is an extreme form of income inequality. For full employment
to be maintained, the consumption of low productivity, expensive goods must be bolstered. In some
cases, which we explore below within a highly simplified model, this is only possible when some house-
holds earn more than others. We derive the minimum value of the Gini coefficient for full employment
(and hence maximum total utility) to be achieved. In a nutshell, our argument is based on the idea that
if the productivity of a non-essential good is too low, its price is too high for any agent to afford in a
strictly egalitarian society. Hence, this good is not produced at all. But if at the same time the essential
good is easy to produce while its utility saturates, only a fraction of the labour force is needed and
output remain low. In this case, global welfare is higher when the Gini coefficient is non-zero, i.e. in
the presence of some degree of wage inequalities. These can be however partly compensated by some
redistributive policies, since tax revenues can be increased.
2 Homogeneous Agents, Equal Wages
We imagine an economy that can produce two goods, 1 & 2, with linear technologies. Production of
good i is given by
Yi = ziNi , (1)
where zi is productivity and Ni labour. Assuming market clearing and, for now, identical wages w for
all, zero profit condition gives the prices at which goods should sell:2
pi =
w
zi
. (2)
We assume z1 > z2 and p1 < p2: Good 1 is a bare necessity good (e.g. wheat), so technology has
evolved to make it easy to produce, whereas good 2 is a non-essential, “luxury” good (e.g. art), with
low productivity. Good 1 is thus cheap, and good 2 is pricey.
In order to keep the algebra as simple as possible, we consider households with strictly saturating
utility functions for both goods:
U =
∑
i
θi min[ci , Γi], (3)
where Γi is the consumption level beyond which no further utility is drawn from consumption. As
Marcel Dassault once quipped, one cannot eat more than one chicken a day; in some cases one can
even imagine that utility starts decreasing beyond some threshold where more goods become useless
and expensive to store. Since we assume good 1 is vital, we will set θ1 > θ2, i.e. households care much
more about buying good 1 and only start buying good 2 when they have quenched their thirst for good
1.
The strict saturation of the utility function is important but not essential in what follows. For non
saturating utility functions, there is no involuntary unemployment even when the productivity is large,
since households are always happy to consume more goods – see Appendix 4 for a discussion of such
cases. As we will show below, this is not true anymore when U saturates, as in Eq. 3.
Finally, we make the crucial assumption that goods are not infinitely divisible, i.e. each agent
cannot consume less than a “quantum” of good γi . There is little use in buying half a painting, or half
a personal computer or half a meal in a posh restaurant, among many examples of expensive, non
2Of course, the average wage can always be taken as the unit in which prices are counted, but we keep w explicit for
clarity.
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essential and indivisible goods. Hence ci ≥ γi for all agents who consume good i. Clearly, one must
impose Γi > γi for the model to make sense. The fact that agents must buy at least γi of good i will be
responsible for making inequalities beneficial in certain regimes of productivity.
2.1 A Primitive Economy
Assume that every household works, either in firms of type 1 or in firms of type 2, such that N1+N2 = N ,
the total number of households. The budget b of each household is spent either on good 1 or on good
2:
b = w=
∑
i
cipi (4)
Since θ1 > θ2, the optimal consumption schedule, as income grows, is to increase c1 until Γ1 while
keeping c2 = 0, beyond which c2 starts picking up. More precisely, as long as p1γ1 ≤ w ≤ p1Γ1, one
has:
c1 =
w
p1
= z1; c2 = 0. (5)
Setting Nc1 = Y1 leads to N = N1, which is compatible with N2 = 0. In this primitive economy, every
household works to produce the basic subsistence good and good 2 is not produced at all. The total
utility U is
U = Nθ1z1 (6)
Now, as the productivity z1 reaches Γ1, households saturate their consumption of good 1 and the econ-
omy should be in a situation where good 2 starts to be produced. Since all households are assumed to
have identical budgets and preferences, the total consumption of good 1 is, using market clearing and
when z1 ≥ Γ1:
C1 = NΓ1 = z1N1 −→ N1 = Nξ1, (7)
with
ξ1 :=
Γ1
z1
< 1 (8)
the fraction of households working to produce good 1.
2.2 A Threshold For Non-Essential Goods
The household’s budget available for good 2 is thus
b2 = w− Γ1p1 = w(1− ξ1), (9)
such that consumption of good 2 is
c2 =
b2
p2
= (1− ξ1)z2, (10)
at least as long as c2 ≤ Γ2, i.e. when 1≤ ξ1 + ξ2. Market clearing for good 2 then yields:
Nc2 = N2z2 −→ N2 = N(1− ξ1) (11)
which brings nothing new since we already know that N1 = Nξ1. However, our assumption that goods
come in indivisible quantum units, one should also have
c2 ≥ γ2, (12)
or
γ2
z2
≤ 1− ξ1 (13)
which is impossible if z2 is smaller than a certain threshold z
∗
2 := γ2/(1− ξ1). Conversely, this can be
stated as a threshold on z1 for a fixed z2: z1 < z
∗
1 with
z∗1 := z2
Γ1
z2 − γ2 (14)
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(and z∗1 = +∞ when z2 ≤ γ2).
In this case, good 2 cannot be produced and N2 = 0. Within our over-simplified economy, the
only solution that allows market clearing of good 1 and homogeneous wages is to assume that each
household works part time, effectively reducing productivity as
z1→ z1φ (15)
where φ ≤ 1 is the fraction of hours worked by households. The optimal total utility solution is thus
φ = ξ1. (16)
This is in agreement with intuition: if a single good can be produced, the total number of working hours
decreases as production increases. The total utility is stuck toU = Nθ1Γ1, while extra utility from good
2 cannot be realized and remains latent. When z1 < z
∗
1, the problem is that nobody is rich enough to
afford buying the “luxury” good, yet the basic good is produced so easily that full employment is not
needed.
The problem with such a solution is that any additional cost proportional to the number of em-
ployees (rather than to the number of working hours) would lead firms not to hire part time workers
but rather to produce the same output with as few employees as possible. This would lead to massive
unemployment, with a fraction 1−ξ1 of unemployed households unable to consume anything, and, in
the absence of social subsidies, some surplus production – clearly not a desirable situation.
In our model, increased productivity of essential goods thus leads to unemployment when wages are
equal. This of course ties in with many arguments and narratives of the past. The Luddite movement
is an obvious example, but even Keynes considered technological progress as a potential source of
unemployment, and one of the underlying mechanism of the Great Depression (see the discussion in
Robert Shiller’s latest book, “Narrative Economics” [18]).
3 A Two-Tier Economy
A way out of this predicament is to allow some households to earn higher wages than others, kick
starting the production of good 2. We will divide the households into N> high earners with wage w>
and N< low earners with wage w<, with N = N> + N<. We also assume for simplicity that the fraction
of high earners is the same in the two types of firms, with the same average wage as before:
w=
N<w< + N>w>
N
. (17)
Therefore, we do not relate productivity to wages and skills, although this would lead to an interesting
generalisation, with a different average wage in firms of type 1 and of type 2. In the present story, high
earners might as well be chosen randomly with probability N>/N . This is of course somewhat silly, but
we want our model to be as bare-bone as possible, and refrain from adding any additional coupling
between skills, productivity and wages.
Since the average wage is the same in all firms, prices are again obtained as:
pi =
w
zi
. (18)
We keep to the case where the basic good is easy to produce, i.e. z1 > Γ1 (ξ1 < 1) henceforth.
3.1 Only High Earners Can Afford Non-Essential Goods
The first situation we shall consider is when low earners do not saturate consumption of good 1, whereas
high earners do. In other words:
w<
p1
< Γ1;
w>
p1
> Γ1, (19)
or, using previous notations and r<,> := w<,>/w being the relative wages:
r< < ξ1; r> > ξ1. (20)
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Total consumption of good 1 is thus
C1 = N<r<z1 + N>Γ1 = N1z1 (21)
where the last equality holds because of market clearing. Hence
N1 = N<r< + N>ξ1. (22)
The high earners budget for the non-essential good 2 is
b2,> = w> − Γ1p1 = w> − ξ1w (> 0). (23)
Hence, consumption of good 2 is
C2 = N>min[b2,>/p2, Γ2]. (24)
Clearly, high earners are overpaid if the consumption of good 2 is saturated, as this will lead to unem-
ployment. So we assume
b2,> ≤ Γ2p2 −→ r> ≤ ξ1 + ξ2. (25)
In fact, the optimal value of r> will turn out to be equal to ξ1 + γ2ξ2/Γ2, which satisfies this bound.
Market clearing of good 2 then implies
N>(r> − ξ1)z2 = N2z2 −→ N2 = N>(r> − ξ1). (26)
Together with Eq. (22), this yields:
N1 + N2 = N<r< + N>ξ1 + N>(r> − ξ1) = N (27)
where we have used Eq. (17). This means that the economic activity is maximized, reaching full
employment.
We still have to check that the condition c2 > γ2 can be fulfilled, so that production of good 2 can
be viable. This requires:
b2,> ≥ γ2p2 −→ r> ≥ ξ1 + ξ2γ2
Γ2
. (28)
3.2 Maximizing Utility and Minimizing Inequalities
Introducing f>,< := N>,</N , we find that the total utility is given by
U
N
= ( f<r< + f>ξ1)z1θ1 + f>(r> − ξ1)z2θ2. (29)
Using f< + f> = 1 and f<r< + f>r> = 1, this expression can be transformed into
U
N
= z1θ1 +
(1− r<)(ξ1 − r>)
r> − r< (z1θ1 − z2θ2) (30)
Since U /N is an increasing function of r<, a benevolent social planner would maximize this utility by
setting r< to its maximum value ξ1, leading to
U
N
= Γ1θ1 + (1− ξ1)z2θ2, (31)
independently of r>, which is not fixed by utility maximisation alone. The social planner might there-
fore look at the Gini coefficient, which is given by
G =
(1− r<)(r> − 1)
r> − r< = 1− ξ1 −
(1− ξ1)2
r> − ξ1 , (32)
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Figure 1: Utility per agent, U /N , and Gini coefficients Gmin (corresponding to optimal welfare) and Gun (corresponding to
partial unemployment), as a function of the basic good productivity z1, for a fixed non-essential good productivity z2 and for
γ2 = 0.5. Left: z2 = 0.4, for which z∗1 = +∞. Right: z2 = 0.7, for which z∗1 = 3.5. Other parameters are fixed to Γ1 = 1.,
θ1 = 1., θ2 = 0.1. The black horizontal line corresponds toU /N = θ1Γ1. The decaying dotted line corresponds to involuntary
unemployment because good 2 is not produced, a situation that is curbed by unequal wages. When z2 = 0.7, the production
of good 2 becomes viable for z1 > z1c = 3.5. Note that the Gini coefficient Gmin is non-monotonic in that case. The letters A,
B, C refer to the different phases in Fig. 2.
which is minimized for the smallest possible value of r>. Hence the relative wages must be chosen as
3
r< = ξ1; r> = ξ1 +
γ2
z2
, (33)
which corresponds to the minimum level of inequalities that achieves full employment and maximum
welfare. The utility of low earners is not worse than in the homogeneous wage case with reduced
working hours. The minimum value of the Gini coefficient is thus:
Gmin = (1− ξ1)

1− z2(1− ξ1)
γ2

. (34)
This is the central result of our paper. Note that, as expected, inequalities decrease as the productivity
of good 2 increases. For a fixed z1, Gmin reaches zero when z2→ z∗2: unsurprisingly, equal salary for all
works again when technology of good 2 improves. For z2 < z
∗
2, partial unemployment would lead to a
much worse total utility and Gini coefficient, given by Gun = 1− ξ1, see Fig. 1.
Note that the total utility, given by Eq. (31), continues to increase as z1 increases past Γ1, even
when z1 < z
∗
1, contrarily to the homogeneous wage solution with reduced working hours, a fortiori to
the solution with unemployment, see Fig. 1. Note however that there is no disutility for labour in our
model – one could of course conclude that working less and only consuming basic goods is a better
option, at the expense of leaving unexploited welfare for the rich on the table. This is, in a nutshell,
the choice advocated by anti-capitalists. The value of Gmin in Eq. (34) can otherwise be considered
as a “fair” value for income inequalities, given the level of technology of the economy, in the sense
that the global welfare is higher than if strict equality of wages was enforced. This in fact creates
unemployment, i.e. another, perhaps worse, form of inequalities. On the other hand, Gini coefficients
larger than Gmin can be deemed unjustified and unfair.
3.3 Low Earners Saturate Consumption of Basic Goods
Finally, let us study the case where productivity of good 1 is so high that both low earners and high
earners can saturate their consumption of good 1, i.e. when
r<, r> > ξ1. (35)
3Note that r> is indeed smaller than ξ1 + ξ2 since γ2 < Γ2.
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Figure 2: “Phase Diagram” of the model, in the plane z1, z2, restricted to the region z2 < z1 where the non-essential good is
more difficult to produce than the bare necessity good. Region A corresponds to a “primitive economy” where all wages are
equal, but good 2 is not produced. Region B corresponds to a developing economy, where productivity of the essential good
is moderately large (Γ1 < z1 < z
∗
1, with z
∗
1 := z2Γ1/(z2 − γ2)). Full employment can only be reached at the expense of wage
inequalities. Region C, for large enough productivity z1 > z
∗
1, allows the economy to recover full employment with equal
wages. Note that region B extends to z1→∞ when z2 < γ2.
The budget of low earners for good 2 is
b2,< = w< − Γ1p1 = w< − ξ1w (> 0). (36)
We keep the constraint that high earners do not saturate consumption of good 2, i.e.
b2,> ≤ Γ2p2. (37)
Total consumption of good 1 is now
C1 = NΓ1 = z1N1 −→ N1 = Nζ1. (38)
For low earners to buy good 2, their budget b2,< must exceed γ2p2, or
r<(1− ξ1)> γ2z2 . (39)
This is, again, only possible if z1 ≥ z∗1, in which case total consumption of good 2 is
C2 =
1
p2
 
N<b2,< + N>b2,>

= N2z2 (40)
or, using p2 = w/z2
N2 = N(1− ζ1)≡ N − N1. (41)
So full employment is possible in this case, with r< = 1, i.e. all wages equal – we just recover the
uniform case above. On the other hand, when z1 < z
∗
1 (or equivalently z2 < z
∗
2), low earners cannot
buy good 2 and unemployment sets in. The different regimes of our model are summarized in Fig. 2.
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4 Conclusion
We have tried to come up with the simplest possible economic model for which in some cases, wage
inequalities lead to higher overall social welfare. In our story, this is due to the fact that the rich class
can consume low productivity, expensive, non essential products, which allows everybody to remain
employed even when the productivity of essential goods is high and producing them does not require
everybody to work. In a sense, our model is a caricature of Tuscan XVth century Renaissance, when
Florence’s wealthy families started subsidising artists and painters.
Within our framework, growth and innovation appear to be intimately related to inequalities on
two counts: (i) improved productivity of essential goods leads to unemployment when utility coming
from consuming these goods saturates beyond a certain level, (ii) the production of low productivity,
luxury goods can only take off if some high earners can afford them.
In our bare-bone model, we find a relation between the minimum Gini coefficient required to make
global welfare optimal and the level of technology, given by Eq. (34), see also Fig. 2 and Eq. (48).
Stronger inequalities appear to be unjustified, both economically and in Rawles’ sense. Conversely,
if wage inequalities are not commensurate to the heterogeneity of productivity across products, total
welfare is reduced. We note that while extra welfare is, in our model, captured by the high earners,
the increase of economic activity should lead to increased tax revenues for the state, allowing part of
this welfare to be redistributed.
There are many directions in which our “Tuscan Renaissance” model should be extended to make it
more realistic. One is to add some disutility of labor and a more elaborate labour market, where skills,
productivity and wages are coupled. Another is to introduce not two, but a continuum of goods with
different levels of productivity and utility, and relate the distribution of productivities to the optimal
distribution of wages. Finally, our model suggests a specific beneficial impact of inequalities on growth
by taking into account the fact that the appearance of a new good may be itself catalyze the emergence
of more innovation, made possible by the production of that very good.
We have focused above on income inequalities, but there might also be an optimal level of wealth
inequalities that allows to kick start new activities in a more efficient way when only one investment
decision is needed, rather than reaching a consensus within larger group of individuals, each of them
unable to invest enough in the project to make it viable.
The role of non-essential goods in the modern economy has in fact been put in a crude light by
the Covid-19 pandemic. The debate over reverting to a leaner economy after the crisis – where only
“essential” goods are produced and wage inequalities are strongly reduced – is already simmering. We
believe that such debates on income and wealth inequalities can only progress if we can come up with
models that allow one to weigh both the beneficial and deleterious aspects of these inequalities, and
normative prescriptions about an optimal level of inequalities with a clear notion of what exactly we
want to optimise. The present paper is a modest attempt in that direction.
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Appendix: Non-Saturating, Concave Utility Functions
Let us reformulate the main results of our paper in the case of a separable constant relative risk aversion
utility:
U =
∑
i
θi
1−σ c
1−σ
i , (42)
with 0 < σ ≤ 1. For simplicity, we set σ = 1/2 as a representative member of that family. Utility
maximisation for a fixed budget w leads to:
ci = ziψi; ψi :=
ziθ
2
i∑
i ziθ
2
i
. (43)
Using market clearing, one also has
Yi = Nci = ziNi → Ni =ψiN , (44)
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and the whole workforce is fully employed. Such a solution is valid provided consumption of indi-
vidual households is above the quantum of good γi . Again, this is not possible if the corresponding
productivities are too low. In the case of two goods, when
c2 = z2ψ2 < γ2 (45)
the production of good 2 is stalled. But since the utility from good 1 always grows with consumption,
households forego good 2 and instead spend all their budget on good 1:
c1 = z1; c2 = 0,
still keeping full employment. The total utility is
U1
2N
:= θ1
p
z1. (46)
Let us now repeat the calculations in this case, but with a fraction f<,> of the population earning
w<,> := r<,>w. When z2ψ2r< < γ2, low earners cannot afford good 2. Since the utility from good 1
always grows with consumption, these households spend all their budget on good 1:
c<1 = z1r<;
whereas for high earners
c>1 = z1ψ1r>; c
>
2 = z2ψ2r>,
with necessarily
r> ≥ r∗> := γ2z2ψ2 .
The labour market always clears since:
Y1 = N ( f<z1r< + f>z1ψ1r>) = z1N1,
and
Y2 = N f>z2ψ2r> = z2N2.
Hence:
N1 = N ( f<r< +ψ1 f>r>) ; N2 = Nψ2 f>r>.
Using ψ1 +ψ2 = 1 and f<r< + f>r> = 1, one finds N1 + N2 = N .
The total utility is now:
U
2N
= f<θ1
p
z1r< + f>

θ1
Æ
z1ψ1r> + θ2
Æ
z2ψ2r>

. (47)
Since
f< =
r> − 1
r> − r< ; f< =
1− r<
r> − r< .
the total utility is only a function of r< and r>. So taking the derivative of U with respect to r< and
r> leads to, respectively:
∂ U
∂ r>
= Ξ>
p
r<r> − β2 (r< + r>)

,
and
∂ U
∂ r<
= Ξ<

1
2
(r< + r>)− βpr<r>

,
where Ξ<,> ≥ 0 and
β :=
Æ
ψ1 +
θ2
p
z2ψ2
θ1
p
z1
.
Since r< + r> ≥ 2pr<r>, one should separate two cases:
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• β ≤ 1: in this case ∂ U/∂ r< ≥ 0 and global welfare is maximized when r< = 1, and therefore
f> = 0. A few high earners may exist, allow good 2 to be produced, but their number is so small
that the utility is equal to U1 and the Gini coefficient is zero.
• β > 1: the optimal low wage is now given by the equation
r2< + (2− 4β2)r>r< + r2> = 0 −→ r< = r∗< := 2β2 − 1−
q
(2β2 − 1)2 − r2>.
On the other hand, since ∂ U/∂ r> ≤ 0, the optimal high wage is given by its lower bound:
r> = r
∗
> :=
γ2
z2ψ2
The last solution however only makes sense provided r∗< ≤ 1, i.e.
β ≥
Æ
3+ r∗2>
2
≥ 1.
In this case, the Gini coefficient is
G =
(1− r∗<)(r∗> − 1)
r∗> − r∗< . (48)
Summarizing: for a non-saturating, concave utility function, one still finds that there is a region
of parameters where inequalities do improve global welfare, when quantisation effects are taken into
account. The phase diagram is however a little different from the one shown in Fig. 2. For fixed values
of z1, θ1 and θ2, one finds that when γ2 is below a certain threshold γ
∗
2 (equal to 0.033/θ
2
2 when
z1θ
2
1 = 1), inequalities are never beneficial. When however γ2 > γ
∗
2, there exists a region z2 ∈ (z†2, z∗2)
within which the optimal wage distribution has a positive Gini coefficient, i.e. when Eq. (48) leads to
G > 0.
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